INTRODUCTION

On 7 May 2026, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey adopted and enacted the Law on Amendments to the Land Registry Law and Certain Other Laws and Decree-Law No. 375 (hereinafter “the Omnibus Law”). A broad-ranging legislative instrument, the Omnibus Law envisages fundamental changes across a number of core statutory frameworks; among these, the amendments made to the Condominium Ownership Law No. 634 are particularly noteworthy. Condominium ownership law has long contended with structural challenges such as increasing urban transformation needs, management disputes, and practical difficulties concerning the use of common areas. The present study will systematically examine the changes introduced by the Omnibus Law to the Condominium Ownership Law, assessing the impact of the new provisions on the existing legal framework, the practical consequences they are expected to engender, and the obligations that arise for condominium owners and building managers.

KEYWORDS: Law No. 7579, Common Expense Advances, Dues, Operating Project, Amendments to the Management Plan

1. MANDATORY APPROVAL OF THE MANAGEMENT PLAN BY THE BOARD OF CONDOMINIUM OWNERS

Within the framework of the amendments made to the relevant provisions of the Condominium Ownership Law No. 634 by the Omnibus Law, the procedural rules governing the preparation and entry into force of the management plan have been reorganised. By virtue of this reform, the management plan has been removed from its status as an administrative document that could be unilaterally prepared and implemented by the building manager, and has been reconstituted as a mandatory decision document subject to the oversight and approval of the board of condominium owners.

Under the previous legal framework, the manager’s authority to prepare and announce the management plan laid the groundwork for various disputes in practice. An examination of cases in which condominium owners contested their allocated shares of common expenses reveals that a substantial proportion of such disputes originated in a lack of transparency in the process of drawing up the management plan, or in the inadequate involvement of condominium owners in that process. The new regulatory framework aims to prevent such problems and elevates the board of condominium owners to the position of a principal actor in the formation of the management plan.

Under the new provision, the manager is under an obligation to submit the management plan for approval by the board of condominium owners. Approval is conditional upon the satisfaction of the quorum requirements for meetings and decisions prescribed by the Condominium Ownership Law. Should the board decline to approve the plan, the manager is required to prepare a new plan and recommence the process. This obligation guarantees the direct participation of condominium owners in the determination of common expenses and advance payment amounts, and simultaneously re-establishes the supervisory balance between the manager and the condominium owners.

The practical implications of this amendment are also highly significant. In the first instance, condominium owners will henceforth have a voice in the determination of annual budgets and expenditure estimates. Furthermore, the prevention of arbitrary practices arising from the manager’s broad discretionary authority and the reinforcement of the principle of accountability in condominium governance are among the expected outcomes. On the other hand, this provision may impose an administrative burden upon condominium owners by requiring more frequent meetings and collective decision-making. It is assessed that this burden will be felt more acutely in large buildings comprising numerous independent units or in situations characterised by deficient communication among condominium owners.

In sum, the requirement that the management plan receive the approval of the board of condominium owners constitutes a structural reform directed at placing condominium governance on a more participatory and transparent footing. The effective operationalisation of this reform is contingent upon condominium owners possessing adequate knowledge of their rights and obligations, and upon managers’ rigorous adherence to the prescribed procedural rules.

2. THE PROVISIONAL MANAGEMENT PLAN AND THE REVALUATION RATE CAP

Another significant innovation introduced to the Condominium Ownership Law by the Omnibus Law is the clarification of the legal framework governing the provisional management plan and the imposition of an upper limit on the rates by which expense items in the management plan may be increased. These two reforms are complementary in character and together give prominence to the principles of legal foreseeability and financial balance in the management of common expenses.

The question of how a manager ought to act in circumstances where the board of condominium owners fails to approve the management plan, or where ordinary statutory procedures cannot be completed, has long been a matter of debate in practice. The Omnibus Law has addressed this lacuna by expressly conferring upon the manager the authority to prepare and implement a provisional management plan in cases where no board-approved management plan is in existence. By its nature, the provisional management plan cannot permanently displace the principal management plan, nor may it be employed as an instrument to invalidate the board’s approval authority. Its purpose is strictly limited to filling the governance vacuum that may arise during the transitional period and to ensuring the continuity of building operations. Accordingly, the provisional management plan ceases to have effect by operation of law upon the board of condominium owners’ approval of a management plan.

The practical significance of this provision is considerable. In particular, extraordinary circumstances such as the inability to convene the board, failure to attain the requisite quorum, or the protraction of disagreements could previously give rise to serious disruptions in the funding of a building’s common expenses. The establishment of a clear statutory basis for the provisional management plan strengthens the legal certainty available to managers in such situations and simultaneously prevents potential prejudice to condominium owners.

A further fundamental reform introduced by the Omnibus Law is the determination of the maximum rate by which expense and advance payment items in the management plan may be increased relative to the preceding year. In this regard, it has been stipulated that increases applied to such items may not exceed the revaluation rate announced annually by the Ministry of Treasury and Finance.

The primary purpose underlying the introduction of the revaluation rate cap is to moderate the financial pressure imposed upon condominium owners by expense increases—particularly during periods of high inflation—and to ensure that common expenses follow a sustainable trajectory. Prior to the amendment, it had been observed in practice that certain managers or boards of condominium owners were sanctioning expense increases substantially in excess of preceding-year figures, frequently citing economic conditions or maintenance and repair requirements as justification. This practice generated significant financial hardship for lower-income condominium owners and was frequently a catalyst for litigation.

Notwithstanding the merits of this reform, it should not be overlooked that the cap may occasion certain difficulties in practice. In cases where a building faces an extraordinary need for repair or renovation, an increase constrained by the revaluation rate may prove insufficient to meet actual costs. It is therefore submitted that the legislature should, in due course, introduce supplementary provisions governing extraordinary expenditures or expressly delineate the exceptions to the cap, with a view to forestalling implementation difficulties in the future.

In conclusion, the regulations concerning the provisional management plan and the revaluation rate cap constitute two complementary reforms aimed at reinforcing both legal foreseeability and financial sustainability in condominium governance. The sound functioning of these provisions will depend upon practitioners’ accurate interpretation of the relevant rules and upon condominium owners’ awareness of the rights available to them thereunder.

3. DECISION QUORUM FOR AMENDMENTS TO MANAGEMENT PLANS IN COLLECTIVE STRUCTURES

Article 28 of the Turkish Condominium Ownership Law stipulates that the management plan is a document binding upon all condominium owners and deemed to have the force of a contract. Accordingly, the management plan does not merely constitute a technical regulation governing the administration of the main property; rather, it possesses the characteristics of a private law contract shaping the legal relationship among condominium owners. Indeed, both the prevailing scholarly opinion and the jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation recognize the contractual nature of the management plan.

The binding effect of the management plan is not limited solely to condominium owners. Managers, members of the board of management, auditors, and members of the audit board are likewise bound by the provisions of the management plan in force, even if they have not personally signed it. In cases where managers or board members are appointed externally and do not hold the status of condominium owners, their obligation to comply with the management plan is explained not on the basis of contractual privity, but rather by their subjection to the normative rules governing their duties and powers. Furthermore, in legal doctrine, such obligation is also considered within the scope of the effects of contracts on third parties.

Given that the management plan constitutes a contractual arrangement binding upon all condominium owners and serves a function in the administration of the main property that is at least as significant as the Condominium Ownership Law itself, amendments thereto are of particular importance. For this reason, the legislator initially prescribed a four-fifths majority requirement for amendments to the management plan; however, taking into consideration the practical difficulties encountered in collective structures, a recent legislative amendment altered the applicable decision quorum.

Pursuant to Article 5 of Law No. 7579 on Amendments to the Land Registry Law, Certain Laws, and Decree Law No. 375, the phrase “four-fifths” contained in the first and second paragraphs of Article 70 of the Condominium Ownership Law was replaced with “two-thirds,” and the following provision was added to the article: “Provisions of management plans contrary to this article shall not be applied.”

Through this amendment, the decision quorum applicable to amendments of management plans specific to collective structures, regulated under the Ninth Chapter of the Condominium Ownership Law entitled “Special Provisions Concerning Collective Structures,” has been redefined. Accordingly, amendments to management plans, which previously required the approval of four-fifths of the total number of independent sections represented within the collective structure representatives’ board, may now be adopted by a two-thirds majority.

Nevertheless, no amendment has been introduced regarding the decision quorum applicable to management plan amendments in structures that do not qualify as collective structures and which remain subject to Article 28 of the Condominium Ownership Law. Therefore, the legislator has chosen to reduce the quorum requirement exclusively with respect to collective structures.

The principal objective of this amendment is to eliminate the practical difficulties experienced in decision-making processes within collective structures consisting of a large number of independent sections. Under the previous regime, the high quorum requirement frequently rendered amendments to management plans practically impossible or caused substantial delays in the process. The new regulation is therefore intended to facilitate decision-making procedures concerning amendments to management plans in collective structures and to ensure a more effective administrative operation in practice. Nevertheless, although reducing the quorum requirement for amending a management plan may provide a practical solution by simplifying decision-making processes, it may also give rise to potential violations of the rights and interests of minority condominium owners, considering the contractual nature of the management plan binding upon all owners.

CONCLUSION

Making the approval of the operating project by the condominium owners’ assembly mandatory constitutes a significant amendment strengthening participation and supervisory mechanisms within condominium management. In this manner, the unilateral discretionary authority previously exercised by managers with respect to the determination of common expenses has been restricted, while ensuring that the will of condominium owners is directly reflected in the determination of dues and advance payment amounts.

Similarly, establishing an explicit legal basis for temporary operating projects and limiting increases in common expenses through the revaluation rate are of considerable importance in terms of financial predictability and the continuity of management activities. Granting the management the authority to establish a temporary budget in cases where the condominium owners’ assembly fails to approve the operating project is intended to prevent interruptions in common area services. Furthermore, imposing an upper limit on increases in dues and common expenses aims to protect condominium owners economically, particularly during periods of high inflation. However, in circumstances requiring extraordinary maintenance and repair works, the possibility that the revaluation rate may prove insufficient to meet actual costs may create new areas of dispute in practice.

The reduction of the decision quorum required for amendments to management plans in collective structures from a four-fifths majority to a two-thirds majority is regarded as a functional intervention aimed at overcoming long-standing decision-making difficulties encountered in practice. Particularly in large-scale collective structures, the inability to amend management plans due to the previously required high quorum significantly hindered administrative processes. Although the new quorum is intended to facilitate decision-making procedures, the contractual nature of management plans binding upon all condominium owners raises concerns that the interests of minority owners may be adversely affected. Accordingly, the implementation of these provisions requires careful observance of the principle of good faith and the balance of interests among condominium owners.

In conclusion, the amendments introduced to the Turkish Condominium Ownership Law through Law No. 7579 contain significant innovations aimed at resolving practical issues arising within condominium ownership law. Although these regulations seek to establish a more transparent, predictable, and functional management structure, they do not entirely eliminate the possibility of new disputes arising in practice. Therefore, it is expected that the full implications of these amendments will become clearer over time through judicial decisions and doctrinal evaluations.